Chimpanzees “can” but sometimes “do not” do it: Restrictions in cognition and motivation

• Published in: The Japanese Journal of Psychonomic Science Vol. 41; no. 2; pp. 125 - 130
• Main Author: Yamamoto Shinya
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: Japanese
• Published: 日本基礎心理学会 31.03.2023; The Japanese Psychonomic Society
• Subjects: apes; cognition vs motivation; human evolution; inability; unwillingness
• ISSN: 0287-7651; 2188-7977
• DOI: 10.14947/psychono.41.20

Human uniqueness is often attributed to highly sophisticated cognitive ability. Through comparative studies with humans and non-human animals, especially our closest evolutionary relatives, behaviors not demonstrated by any non-human animals are considered unique to humans, and this inaction is then explained as arising due to a lack of necessary background cognitive abilities. However, even if non-human animals do not demonstrate a certain behavior, it is too early to say they cannot. There has been accumulating evidence that non-human animals do have the necessary cognitive bases for certain complex behaviors, yet still do not perform these in their everyday lives. By introducing some examples of chimpanzees’ social and cultural behaviors, I propose four hypotheses to explain their inaction, three of which are more focused on motivational than cognitive restrictions. This paper mainly discusses, from a motivational perspective, why certain behaviors do not manifest themselves despite evidence for their cognitive foundations.