The Earlier Wittgenstein on the Notion of Religious Attitude

• Published in: Philosophy (London) Vol. 88; no. 343; pp. 55 - 79
• Main Author: TEJEDOR, CHON
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Cambridge Cambridge University Press 01.01.2013
• Subjects: Epistemology. Philosophy of science. Theory of knowledge; Philosophy; Knowledge theory
• ISSN: 0031-8191; 1469-817X

I defend a new interpretation of Wittgenstein's notion of religious (or ethical) attitude in the Tractatus, one that rejects three key views from the secondary literature: firstly, the view that, for Wittgenstein, the willing subject is a transcendental condition for the religious attitude; secondly, the view that the religious attitude is an emotive response to the world or something closely modelled on this notion of emotive response; and thirdly, the view that, although the religious and ethical pseudo-propositions of the Tractatus are nonsensical, they nevertheless succeed in expressing the religious attitude endorsed by Wittgenstein. In connection to the first, I argue that the notion of willing subject as transcendental condition is abandoned by Wittgenstein in the Notebooks and is no longer a feature of his position in the Tractatus. In connection to the second, I argue that the religious attitude is dispositional rather than emotive for Wittgenstein: it is a disposition to use signs in a way that demonstrates one's conceptual clarity. Finally, in connection to the third, I argue that the religious or ethical attitude is strongly ineffable in that it cannot be described, expressed or conveyed by language at all.