Non-Cooperative Tacit Collusion, Complementary Bidding and Incumbency Premium
This article focuses on testing the intuitive idea of Folk Theorem in a repeated game, and the existence of complementary bidding and incumbency premium. Through careful analysis of bidding behaviors in the Dallas-Ft. Worth (DFW) school-milk industry, I find that cooperation based on rationality and...
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Published in | Review of industrial organization Vol. 15; no. 2; pp. 115 - 134 |
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Main Author | |
Format | Journal Article |
Language | English |
Published |
Boston
Kluwer Academic Publishers
01.09.1999
Springer Nature B.V |
Subjects | |
Online Access | Get full text |
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Summary: | This article focuses on testing the intuitive idea of Folk Theorem in a repeated game, and the existence of complementary bidding and incumbency premium. Through careful analysis of bidding behaviors in the Dallas-Ft. Worth (DFW) school-milk industry, I find that cooperation based on rationality and repetition satisfies the conditions for a kind of Folk Theorem. The data also strongly suggest that all major milk processors are engaged in complementary bidding to allocate consumers geographically and command statistically significant incumbency premia in their incumbent districts. Even if the equilibrium outcomes are largely non-cooperative, some pieces of circumstantial evidence uncovered in this school-milk market study may be sufficiently convincing to enable dispensing with evidence of actual communication. |
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Bibliography: | ObjectType-Article-2 SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-1 content type line 23 |
ISSN: | 0889-938X 1573-7160 |
DOI: | 10.1023/A:1007705126893 |