Neutral Color Concepts

• Published in: Philosophical studies Vol. 91; no. 1; pp. 21 - 41
• Main Author: KLIEWER, G
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Heidelberg Kluwer Academic Publishers 01.07.1998; Sringer; University of Minnesota Press; Springer Nature B.V
• Subjects: Argumentation; Attitudes; Children; Color; Colors; Common sense; Epistemology. Philosophy of science. Theory of knowledge; Experiments; Mental objects; Morality; Ontology; Pain perception; Philosophers; Philosophical object; Philosophy; Possession; Pragmatics; Quality; Realism; Representationalism; Semantics; Sense impressions; Thought experiments; Truth; Values; Visual perception; Concept; Space; Sensation; Transparency; Neuter; Similitude; Representationalism; Colour; Peacocke (C.); Phenomenology; Contents; Quality;Qualities; Object; Locke (J.); Property; Recognition
• ISSN: 0031-8116; 1573-0883
• DOI: 10.1023/A:1004235911419

[...]I take the notion of a color quality space to be that of an ordered set of concepts for determining the similarities/dissimilarities understood to hold between the colors.8 These in turn are the concepts by which we discriminate the colors in the first place. [...]the traditional dispositionalist must say that we first learn the concepts for the object colors.16 But it is here that he runs into insuperable difficulties, since he does not have the resources for making sense of color representational content, how we succeed in representing the object colors.NEUTRAL COLOR CONCEPTS[n03] 27To appreciate this problem we do not need a complete theory of representation but only the following necessary condition from such a theory: for an experience to be representational it must not involve direct awareness of its constitutive sensations; if an experience is to succeed in representing objects, the sensations constitutive of that experience must be transparent or diaphanous within the experience. [...]because the idea of a neutral or cross categorical color property is metaphysically implausible, possession of neutral concepts would thereby warrant the ascription of serious error and an attitude of skepticism towards the colors.Conceding neutral color properties would indeed warrant the ascription of error. [...]correct application conditions seem to be to the grasping of concepts what truth conditions in Dummettian semantics are to the meaning of predicates.Also, its worth noting that concepts for Peacocke are psychological constituents of mental states rather than semantic values or even abstract entities see Millar 1991, note 1.27 My argumentation here of course cannot be conclusive, since the possession of a single quality space is consistent with representationalism.28 I am grateful to an anonymous referee at Philosophical Studies for raising this objection.29 See note 13.30 Johnston 1992 adopts a pragmatic attitude towards these two positions, linking ontological commitment to theoretical outlook.