Comprehending Conceptual Structure in Risk Through Phenomenology
Although there have been many studies on the concept of risk in previous research, there is no widely accepted concept or definition of risk. Since risk is a concept and does not exist in nature, its essential nature cannot be pursued in ways that are generally considered scientific. This has implic...
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Published in | Journal of Socio-Informatics Vol. 17; no. 1; pp. 35 - 55 |
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Main Author | |
Format | Journal Article |
Language | English |
Published |
The Society of Socio-Informatics
2024
一般社団法人 社会情報学会 |
Subjects | |
Online Access | Get full text |
ISSN | 1882-9171 2432-2156 |
DOI | 10.14836/jsi.17.1_35 |
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Summary: | Although there have been many studies on the concept of risk in previous research, there is no widely accepted concept or definition of risk. Since risk is a concept and does not exist in nature, its essential nature cannot be pursued in ways that are generally considered scientific. This has implications for risk management and risk engineering. To solve this problem, we attempt to abstract the structure that makes people feel a particular way, which is common when people feel that there is some risk in a way that does not specify the field or type of risk, through phenomenology and non-conventional science based on it. The structure of risk from the perspective of the perceiver can be summarized as (1) having a future story that the perceiver does not want to be influenced by surroundings and (2) holding a personal belief, doxa, or conjecture that an incident may affect the progress of that story and prevent it from going forward as expected. Having a future story is the premise for the existence of risk, while holding a person belief about the story's progress is the essential nature of what we generally call risk. This new perspective could trigger a paradigm shift in risk-related academia and practices, such as risk management and risk communication. |
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ISSN: | 1882-9171 2432-2156 |
DOI: | 10.14836/jsi.17.1_35 |