Correcting Errors in Private Keys Obtained from Cold Boot Attacks

• Published in: Information Security and Cryptology - ICISC 2011 pp. 74 - 87
• Main Authors: Lee, Hyung Tae, Kim, HongTae, Baek, Yoo-Jin, Cheon, Jung Hee
• Format: Book Chapter
• Language: English; Japanese
• Published: Berlin, Heidelberg Springer Berlin Heidelberg 2012
• Series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science
• Subjects: Cold Boot Attack; Discrete Logarithm; RSA; Side Channel Attack
• ISBN: 9783642319112; 3642319114
• ISSN: 0302-9743; 1611-3349
• DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-31912-9_6

Based on the cold boot attack technique, this paper proposes a new algorithm to obtain the private key of the discrete logarithm (DL) based cryptosystems and the standard RSA from its erroneous value. The proposed algorithm achieves almost the square root complexity of search space size. More precisely, the private key of the DL based system with 160-bit key size can be recovered in 243.24 exponentiations while the complexity of the exhaustive search is 271.95 exponentiations if the error rate is given by 10%. In case of the standard RSA with 1024-bit key size, our algorithm can recover the private key with 249.08 exponentiations if the error rate is given by 1%. Compared with the efficiency of some algorithms [7,6] to recover the private key in RSA using Chinese Remainder Theorem, the recoverable error rate of our algorithm is quite small. However, our algorithm requires only partial information of the private key d while other algorithms require additional information such as partial information of factors of the RSA modulus N. The proposed algorithm can also be used for breaking countermeasure of differential power analysis attack. In the standard RSA, one uses the randomized exponent \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$\tilde{d}=d+r\cdot\phi(N)$\end{document} instead of the decryption exponent d with the random value r. When the size of a random value r is 26-bit, it can be shown that the randomized exponent can be recovered with 249.30 exponentiations if the error rate is 1%. Finally, we also consider the breaking countermeasure that splits the decryption exponent d into d1 and d2 of same size.