Acting with an intention

It seems very natural to suppose that acting intentionally is acting with an intention. Since having an intention is being in a certain state of mind, it follows that acting intentionally essentially involves being in a certain state of mind. This may appear to support an inward-looking approach to...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inAction Vol. 14; pp. 99 - 117
Main Author Stout, Rowland
Format Book Chapter
LanguageEnglish
Published Canada MQUP 2006
McGill-Queen's University Press
Subjects
Aerospace engineering
Aircraft
Ancient philosophy
Applied sciences
Aristotelianism
Arts
Attack aircraft
Aviation
Axiology
Behavioral sciences
Bomber aircraft
Causal explanations
Causal theory
Causality
Cognitive psychology
Consequentialism
Desire
Double effect
Emotion
Emotional states
Engineering
Ethics
Etiology
Fear
Hazardous substances
Historical methodology
Historiography
History
History of philosophy
Human behavior
Intentional action
Keyboard instruments
Killing
Materials
Materials science
Metaphysics
Military aircraft
Music
Musical instruments
Normative ethics
Performing arts
Philosophical action theory
Philosophy
Philosophy of mind
Pianos
Poisons
Psychology
String instruments
Violence
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Summary:It seems very natural to suppose that acting intentionally is acting with an intention. Since having an intention is being in a certain state of mind, it follows that acting intentionally essentially involves being in a certain state of mind. This may appear to support an inward-looking approach to agency: an approach that attempts to find the essence of agency in some aspect of the agent’s state of mind. But this defence of an inward-looking approach depends on an inward-looking approach to intentions. Its correctness depends on intentions being mental entities that can be understood independently of their role in
ISBN:0773530487
9780773530485
DOI:10.1515/9780773585539-008