On the Peace of Westphalia

• Published in: International Relations Vol. 2010; no. 160; pp. 160_48 - 63
• Main Author: Takayama, Iwao
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English; Japanese
• Published: JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 2012
• ISSN: 0454-2215; 1883-9916
• DOI: 10.11375/kokusaiseiji.160_48

It was in his monographic essay titled “Westphalia and All That” that international relations scholar Steven D. krasner criticized the “orthodox” view that the peace of Westphalia of 1648 marks the end of the old medieval world and the beginning of a new era in international relations history. Leo Gross, a prominent internationa law expert, had similarly maintained that Westphalia was the starting point for the development of modern international law and that it was “the majestic portal which leads from the old into the new world”. Krasner rejected both the “orthodox” and Gross' views as “wrong”. Krasner's criticism is based on three propositions; 1) “History is not so neatly compartmentalized”; Westphalia was neither an end nor a beginning; 2) The basic issue at Westphalia was not so much one of building a new international order based on sovereign equality of states as a more reaistic one of how the Holy Roman Empire, which had lost the war, would satisfy France and Sweden, which had won; 3)Contrary to the “orthodox” view, Westphalia was “past-oriented”, in the sense that most of the issues taken up there were those of the feudal period, such as hereditary succession, composition of the Diet, election of the Empperor, etc. The purpose of the present study is to place the “orthodox” and Gross' views against the background of Krasner's criticism in an effort to judge which side can provide more adequate and convincing evidence for a satisfactory interpretation of Westphalia. By employing what we propose to call a “symbolic monument” approach, which “constructs” history by connecting historical evidence with interpretation, we have examined such issues as the role of “world charters”, laicization of international law, the system of collective security, and the policy of prestige and diplomatic formalities, and arrived at the conclusion that the “orthodox” and Gross' views are convincing enough to warrant full recognition, while krasner fails to “construct” his own history to make his criticism meaningful. Criticism for the sake of criticism alone does not lead to a discerning knowledge and evaluation of historical realities. “Construction” of history must accompany criticism.We fully share, however, Krasner's admonition that history is not so neatly compartmentalized, and probably it is through the sharing of this admonition with him that a diaogue will begin between us.