A No-Go Theorem for the Mind–Body Problem An Informal Proof that No Purely Physical System Can Exhibit All the Properties of Human Consciousness

This article presents an operationalized solution to the mind–body problem which relies on a well-defined effective procedure rather than philosophical argument. I identify a specific operation which is a necessary property of all healthy human conscious individuals — specifically the operation of s...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published inThe Journal of mind and behavior Vol. 40; no. 2; pp. 95 - 120
Main Author Reason, Catherine M.
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published New York Institute of Mind and Behavior, Inc 01.04.2019
Institute of Mind & Behavior
Subjects
Cognition & reasoning
Consciousness
Logic
Mathematics
Mind body relationship
Philosophy
Quantum physics
Theory
Online AccessGet full text

Cover

More Information
Summary:This article presents an operationalized solution to the mind–body problem which relies on a well-defined effective procedure rather than philosophical argument. I identify a specific operation which is a necessary property of all healthy human conscious individuals — specifically the operation of self-certainty, or the capacity of healthy conscious humans to “know” with certainty that they are conscious. This operation is shown to be inconsistent with the properties possible in any meaningful definition of a physical system. I demonstrate this inconsistency by proving a “no-go” theorem for any physical system capable of human logical reasoning, if this reasoning is required to be both sound and consistent. The proof of this theorem is both general — it applies to any function whereby evidence affects the state of some physical system — and recursive, since any physical process subserving a function of this type is shown to imply another such function. Thus, for at least one aspect of human consciousness, the mind–body problem is resolved.
ISSN:0271-0137
2994-9602