Functionalism

Philosophers working on the psycho-physical identity thesis around the middle of the last century were focusing chiefly on consciousness rather than intentionality. As far as beliefs, desires and other intentional states were concerned, they tended to think a behaviouristic account was possible. How...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inMind and Body Vol. 11; pp. 121 - 135
Main Author Kirk, Robert
Format Book Chapter
LanguageEnglish
Published Canada MQUP 2003
McGill-Queen's University Press
Subjects
American philosophy
Analytic philosophy
Behavioral sciences
Behaviorism
Cognitive psychology
Consciousness
Dualism
Etiology
Functionalism
Identity
Logical positivism
Metaphilosophy
Metaphysical naturalism
Metaphysics
Mind body dichotomy
Monism
Naturalism
Ontology
Perception theory
Perceptual experiences
Personality psychology
Philosophy
Philosophy of mind
Physicalism
Psychology
Qualia
Ramsey sentences
Western philosophy
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Summary:Philosophers working on the psycho-physical identity thesis around the middle of the last century were focusing chiefly on consciousness rather than intentionality. As far as beliefs, desires and other intentional states were concerned, they tended to think a behaviouristic account was possible. However, we have seen that merely asserting that conscious experiences are identical with brain processes is not enough. Even if the identities hold, what is it about brain processes that enables them to provide for conscious experience? Somehow it must be made intelligible that things like the activation of neurones should constitute sensations and experiences. When philosophers started
ISBN:9780773526730
0773526730
DOI:10.1515/9780773582828-007