Performance of Wireless Heterogeneous Networks with Always-best-connected Users

We consider a geographic area covered by two wireless networks. Assuming delay-sensitive users, we study the loss of efficiency of the user equilibrium (the Price of Anarchy) in terms of total delay, with M/M/l delay functions on each network. The user equilibrium is proved to be less efficient when...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in2009 Next Generation Internet Networks pp. 1 - 8
Main Authors Kaci, N., Maille, P., Bonnin, J.-M.
Format Conference Proceeding
LanguageEnglish
Published IEEE 01.07.2009
Subjects
Communications technology
Costs
Finance
Loss measurement
Mobile computing
Pricing
Quality of service
Telecommunications
Wireless communication
Wireless networks
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Summary:We consider a geographic area covered by two wireless networks. Assuming delay-sensitive users, we study the loss of efficiency of the user equilibrium (the Price of Anarchy) in terms of total delay, with M/M/l delay functions on each network. The user equilibrium is proved to be less efficient when the network is very heterogeneous, i.e. the two networks have different capacities. In order to elicit coordination among users, we suggest to use marginal cost pricing. We investigate the computation of the optimal taxes to use, and give several arguments in favor of the technical feasibility of such a scheme. Applying taxes therefore seems particularly well-suited to improve the overall performance of a network selection game with selfish users.
ISBN:1424442443
9781424442447
DOI:10.1109/NGI.2009.5175776