Instance-Level Trojan Attacks on Visual Question Answering via Adversarial Learning in Neuron Activation Space

Trojan attacks embed perturbations in input data leading to malicious behavior in neural network models. A combination of various Trojans in different modalities enables an adversary to mount a sophisticated attack on multimodal learning such as Visual Question Answering (VQA). However, multimodal T...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in2024 International Joint Conference on Neural Networks (IJCNN) pp. 1 - 9
Main Authors Sun, Yuwei, Ochiai, Hideya, Sakuma, Jun
Format Conference Proceeding
LanguageEnglish
Published IEEE 30.06.2024
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Summary:Trojan attacks embed perturbations in input data leading to malicious behavior in neural network models. A combination of various Trojans in different modalities enables an adversary to mount a sophisticated attack on multimodal learning such as Visual Question Answering (VQA). However, multimodal Trojans in conventional methods are susceptible to parameter adjustment during processes such as fine-tuning. To this end, we propose an instance-level multimodal Trojan attack on VQA that efficiently adapts to fine-tuned models through a dual-modality adversarial learning method. This method compromises two specific neurons in a specific perturbation layer in the pretrained model to produce overly large neuron activations. Then, a malicious correlation between these overactive neurons and the malicious output of a fine-tuned model is established through adversarial learning. Extensive experiments are conducted using the VQA-v2 dataset, based on a wide range of metrics including sample efficiency, stealthiness, and robustness. The proposed attack demonstrates enhanced performance with diverse vision and text Trojans tailored for each sample. We demonstrate that the proposed attack can be efficiently adapted to different fine-tuned models, by injecting only a few shots of Trojan samples. Moreover, we investigate the attack performance under conventional defenses, where the defenses cannot effectively mitigate the attack.
ISSN:2161-4407
DOI:10.1109/IJCNN60899.2024.10651460