Rawlsian Justice and Palliative Care
Palliative care serves both as an integrated part of treatment and as a last effort to care for those we cannot cure. The extent to which palliative care should be provided and our reasons for doing so have been curiously overlooked in the debate about distributive justice in health and healthcare....
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Published in | Bioethics Vol. 29; no. 8; pp. 536 - 542 |
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Main Authors | , |
Format | Journal Article |
Language | English |
Published |
England
Blackwell Publishing Ltd
01.10.2015
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Subjects | |
Online Access | Get full text |
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Summary: | Palliative care serves both as an integrated part of treatment and as a last effort to care for those we cannot cure. The extent to which palliative care should be provided and our reasons for doing so have been curiously overlooked in the debate about distributive justice in health and healthcare. We argue that one prominent approach, the Rawlsian approach developed by Norman Daniels, is unable to provide such reasons and such care. This is because of a central feature in Daniels' account, namely that care should be provided to restore people's opportunities. Daniels' view is both unable to provide pain relief to those who need it as a supplement to treatment and, without justice‐based reasons to provide palliative care to those whose opportunities cannot be restored. We conclude that this makes Daniels' framework much less attractive. |
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Bibliography: | istex:79E2381AD726CA935BB8B0F5E45C37226AB93955 ark:/67375/WNG-550505R0-J ArticleID:BIOE12156 ObjectType-Article-1 SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-2 content type line 23 |
ISSN: | 0269-9702 1467-8519 |
DOI: | 10.1111/bioe.12156 |