Contextualism and Counter-Closure

I argue that DeRose's attributor contextualism cannot straightforwardly preserve the widespread view that, when a subject believes q solely on the basis of competent deduction from p, knowledge of q requires knowledge of p. I present a novel challenge to the compatibility of this widespread vie...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inDialectica Vol. 66; no. 1; pp. 187 - 199
Main Author LUZZI, Federico
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Oxford, UK Blackwell Publishing Ltd 01.03.2012
Blackwell
Subjects
Ascriptions
Belief
Contextualism
Epistemological contextualism
Inference
Justified beliefs
Notes and Discussions
Philosophical logics. Philosophy of language
Philosophy
Relevant alternatives
Saliency
Skepticism
Truth
Analytical Philosophy
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Summary:I argue that DeRose's attributor contextualism cannot straightforwardly preserve the widespread view that, when a subject believes q solely on the basis of competent deduction from p, knowledge of q requires knowledge of p. I present a novel challenge to the compatibility of this widespread view with DeRose's contextualism, then argue that the tension can be resolved in only one of two ways: if DeRose rejects the widespread view or if DeRose accepts the existence of a range of contextualism-specific Gettier-style cases.
Bibliography:istex:07A87FFB29622C91633BB44A246BC6F1FB346A29
ark:/67375/WNG-J9Q4VF99-M
ArticleID:DLTC1280
ISSN:0012-2017
1746-8361
DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.2011.01280.x