Impact analysis of spoofing on different-grade GNSS receivers

• Published in: 2023 IEEE/ION Position, Location and Navigation Symposium (PLANS) pp. 492 - 499
• Main Authors: Islam, Saiful, Bhuiyan, M. Zahidul H., Paakkonen, Into, Saajasto, Mika, Makela, Maija, Kaasalainen, Sanna
• Format: Conference Proceeding
• Language: English
• Published: IEEE 24.04.2023
• Subjects: Global navigation satellite system; GNSS receivers; Interference; Jamming; Navigation; Receivers; Security; spoofing; Timing
• ISSN: 2153-3598
• DOI: 10.1109/PLANS53410.2023.10139934

Man-made threats to Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS)-dependent infrastructures are constantly evolving as malicious actors strive to stay one step ahead of security safeguards. A GNSS receiver that satisfies a certain standard of resilience in 2023 may not be sufficient by the end of the decade if a brand-new or previously unknown type of interference emerges in the meantime. GNSS spoofing is a significant concern as it is an intentional form of interference that aims to deceive a receiver into accepting counterfeit signals as genuine. The technical challenges of spoofing GNSS receivers are higher compared to jamming, and the consequences can be more severe, as the receiver may use tampered signals for Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT), resulting in misleading position and time information. This paper analyzes the potential impact of spoofing on commercial- and mass-market-grade GNSS receivers. The impact analysis is also be supported by an in-house open-source software-defined research receiver named 'FGI-GSRx'. Additionally, findings from the real-world spoofing test conducted during Jammer test campaign 2022 in Norway, are also be presented.