Cracking the Stateful Nut: Computational Proofs of Stateful Security Protocols using the Squirrel Proof Assistant

Bana and Comon have proposed a logical approach to proving protocols in the computational model, which they call the Computationally Complete Symbolic Attacker (CCSA). The proof assistant Squirrel implements a verification technique that elaborates on this approach, building on a meta-logic over the...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in2022 IEEE 35th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF) pp. 289 - 304
Main Authors Baelde, David, Delaune, Stephanie, Koutsos, Adrien, Moreau, Solene
Format Conference Proceeding
LanguageEnglish
Published IEEE 01.08.2022
Subjects
Automation
Buildings
Cognition
Computational modeling
Computational Security
Computer security
Formal Methods
Interactive Theorem Proving
Logic
Protocols
Security Protocols
Semantics
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Summary:Bana and Comon have proposed a logical approach to proving protocols in the computational model, which they call the Computationally Complete Symbolic Attacker (CCSA). The proof assistant Squirrel implements a verification technique that elaborates on this approach, building on a meta-logic over the CCSA base logic. In this paper, we show that this meta-logic can naturally be extended to handle protocols with mutable states (key updates, counters, etc.) and we extend Squirrel'S proof system to be able to express the complex proof arguments that are sometimes required for these protocols. Our theoretical contributions have been implemented in Squirrel and validated on a number of case studies, including a proof of the YubiKey and YubiHSM protocols.
DOI:10.1109/CSF54842.2022.9919665