Game theoretic analysis of joint link adaptation and distributed power control in GPRS

In this paper, using non-cooperative game theory, we present a joint link adaptation and power control algorithm for GPRS (general packet radio service). We propose a utility model and analytically verify the existence of a Nash equilibrium (NE) in the network. We then propose a solution method and...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in2003 IEEE 58th Vehicular Technology Conference. VTC 2003-Fall (IEEE Cat. No.03CH37484) Vol. 2; pp. 732 - 736 Vol.2
Main Authors Ginde, S., Neel, J., Buehrer, R.M.
Format Conference Proceeding
LanguageEnglish
Published IEEE 2003
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Summary:In this paper, using non-cooperative game theory, we present a joint link adaptation and power control algorithm for GPRS (general packet radio service). We propose a utility model and analytically verify the existence of a Nash equilibrium (NE) in the network. We then propose a solution method and validate our work by simulating a seven-cell distributed system. Non-unique NE are shown to exist. The effects of the key parameters of the game are evaluated. We introduce three figures of merit (FOMs) that express the tradeoff between throughput and energy efficiency for the entire network. The FOMs are used to calculate the optimal values of penalty function parameters and to compare different NE. The proposed scheme is finally compared with another multirate power control technique.
ISBN:0780379543
9780780379541
ISSN:1090-3038
2577-2465
DOI:10.1109/VETECF.2003.1285117