Crowdsourcing contest dilemma game with unreliable channels

• Published in: 2016 35th Chinese Control Conference (CCC) pp. 1286 - 1291
• Main Authors: Dai, Qing, Lu, Jianfeng, Tang, Changbing, Xu, Dewu, Peng, Hao
• Format: Conference Proceeding Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: TCCT 01.07.2016
• Subjects: antisocial behavior; Channels; Competition; Conferences; Crowdsourcing; Decision support systems; equilibrium; Game theory; Games; Internet; Norms; Problem solving; unreliable channels
• ISSN: 2161-2927; 1934-1768
• DOI: 10.1109/ChiCC.2016.7553265

The Internet has caused the skills of world wide-scale collective problem solving, which is known as crowdsourcing that connects the individuals around the world to cooperate and solve the multifarious complex problem. However, due to the openness prominent features of crowdsourcing, it conceives some antisocial behaviors, such as sabotaging, attacking, plagiarizing, and manipulating the solution obtained by collective individuals. Crowdsourcing contest dilemma game was recently proposed, which shows that the malicious behavior is the norm in crowdsourcing competitions. In this paper, we extend the two-stage game by introducing the unreliable channels to analyze the process of equilibrium based on game theory. Under the current framework structure, we first analyze the situation in the second stage (to attack or not), and then take a step back and discuss the players' decisions (crowdsource or in-house) in the first stage. We find that the unreliable channels would affect a less desirable total profit to some extent, what's more, there are still crowdsourcing contest dilemmas in the crowdsourcing competitions under the unreliable channels.