Unlinkability of an Improved Key Agreement Protocol for EMV 2nd Gen Payments

To address known privacy problems with the EMV standard, EMVCo have proposed a Blinded Diffie-Hellman key establishment protocol, which is intended to be part of a future 2nd Gen EMV protocol. We point out that active attackers were not previously accounted for in the privacy requirements of this pr...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in2022 IEEE 35th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF) pp. 364 - 379
Main Authors Horne, Ross, Mauw, Sjouke, Yurkov, Semen
Format Conference Proceeding
LanguageEnglish
Published IEEE 01.08.2022
Subjects
Authentication
bisimilarity
Cognition
Encryption
key agreement
Proposals
Protocols
Stakeholders
unlinkability
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Summary:To address known privacy problems with the EMV standard, EMVCo have proposed a Blinded Diffie-Hellman key establishment protocol, which is intended to be part of a future 2nd Gen EMV protocol. We point out that active attackers were not previously accounted for in the privacy requirements of this proposal protocol, and demonstrate that an active attacker can compromise unlinkability within a distance of 100cm. Here, we adopt a strong definition of unlinkability that does account for active attackers and propose an enhancement of the protocol proposed by EMVCo. We prove that our protocol does satisfy strong unlinkability, while preserving authentication.
DOI:10.1109/CSF54842.2022.9919666