EMPIRICAL INQUIRY AND PROOF

In this paper the later Wittgenstein’s distinction between proofs and experiments and its place in his philosophy of mathematics is explored. Section I observes that his apriorism must also be considered in this context, for he makes a parallel division between the sorts of statements which proofs o...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published inProof and Knowledge in Mathematics pp. 75 - 90
Format Book Chapter
LanguageEnglish
Published United Kingdom Routledge 1992
Taylor & Francis Group
Subjects
Mathematical logic
Philosophy of mathematics
Epistemic Construal
Inclined
Wittgenstein’s View
Parallel Division
Experiment Distinction
Follow
Timeless
Mathematical Result
Terrible Noise
Concepts Proof
Wittgenstein’s Distinction
Specific Constructions
Holds
Mathematical Proposition
Violated
Logical Features
Memorable Configuration
Mathematical Conviction
Potential Prover
Prophecies
Wittgenstein’s Philosophy
Proof Shows
Toto
Empirical Propositions
Gauss’s Proof
Online AccessGet full text
ISBN9780415068055
0415068053
DOI10.4324/9780203979105-11

Cover

More Information
Summary:In this paper the later Wittgenstein’s distinction between proofs and experiments and its place in his philosophy of mathematics is explored. Section I observes that his apriorism must also be considered in this context, for he makes a parallel division between the sorts of statements which proofs or experiments establish. Sections II and III provide, respectively, background material about the proof/experiment distinction and the rather persuasive evidence Wittgenstein gives for drawing it. There is some discussion of his thesis that proofs are models or rules governing empirical investigation, but lengthier comments about certain fundamental, “logical” features he ascribes to proofs.
ISBN:9780415068055
0415068053
DOI:10.4324/9780203979105-11