Equilibrium strategy of a processor-sharing system with discriminatory discipline

We study the equilibrium strategies of a processor-sharing service system with discriminatory discipline. We consider both cases that customer can or cannot observe how many customers in the system upon arrival. Respectively, we obtain a threshold strategy for each class of customers in the observab...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in2013 IEEE International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management pp. 877 - 881
Main Authors Ying Shi, Zhaotong Lian
Format Conference Proceeding
LanguageEnglish
Published IEEE 01.12.2013
Subjects
Abstracts
Discriminatory processor-sharing system
Educational institutions
Equations
equilibrium strategy
Mathematical model
Nash equilibrium
Numerical models
Operations research
queueing system
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Summary:We study the equilibrium strategies of a processor-sharing service system with discriminatory discipline. We consider both cases that customer can or cannot observe how many customers in the system upon arrival. Respectively, we obtain a threshold strategy for each class of customers in the observable case, and the customer's equilibrium arrival rate in the unobservable case. And further, we derive the bounds of the service price and give an effective algorithm to calculate the optimal service price to maximize the service provider's profit. Finally, some numerical examples are given to verify our results.
ISSN:2157-3611
2157-362X
DOI:10.1109/IEEM.2013.6962537