Optimal control in the presence of an intelligent jammer with limited actions

We consider a dynamic zero-sum game between two players. The first player acts as a controller for a discrete time LTI plant, while the second player acts to jam the communication between the controller and the plant. The number of jamming actions is limited. We determine saddle-point equilibrium co...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in49th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC) pp. 1096 - 1101
Main Authors Gupta, A, Langbort, Cédric, Başar, Tamer
Format Conference Proceeding
LanguageEnglish
Published IEEE 01.12.2010
Subjects
Aerospace electronics
Cost function
Equations
Games
Jamming
Optimal control
Probability density function
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Summary:We consider a dynamic zero-sum game between two players. The first player acts as a controller for a discrete time LTI plant, while the second player acts to jam the communication between the controller and the plant. The number of jamming actions is limited. We determine saddle-point equilibrium control and jamming strategies for this game under the full state, total recall information structure for both players, and show that the jammer acts according to a threshold policy at each decision step. Various properties of the threshold functions are derived and complemented by numerical simulation studies.
ISBN:142447745X
9781424477456
ISSN:0191-2216
DOI:10.1109/CDC.2010.5717544