Networking Effects on Public Goods Game with Unequal Allocation

Incorporating unequal allocation into the original public goods game, we study the effects of spatial structures on the extent of the emergence of cooperation. By playing the game on random regular networks with a fixed degree 2 K, we find that the cooperator frequencies are not only related to the...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in2008 Fourth International Conference on Natural Computation Vol. 1; pp. 217 - 221
Main Authors Li-Xin Zhong, Bi-Hui Chen, Chun-Yun Huang
Format Conference Proceeding
LanguageEnglish
Published IEEE 01.10.2008
Subjects
Animal structures
Computer networks
Cooperation
Extinction coefficients
Frequency
Humans
Investments
Networking Effects
Numerical simulation
Public Goods Game
Radio spectrum management
Stability
Steady-state
Unequal Allocation
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Summary:Incorporating unequal allocation into the original public goods game, we study the effects of spatial structures on the extent of the emergence of cooperation. By playing the game on random regular networks with a fixed degree 2 K, we find that the cooperator frequencies are not only related to the average degree of the network but also the rewiring process. Randomizing a regular network will lead to the decrease of the average path length and the clustering coefficient of the network, which furtherly shortens the relaxation time for the system to reach the final steady state and suppresses the frequencies of cooperation. A linear relationship between the cooperator frequencies and the clustering coefficient is found.
ISBN:9780769533049
0769533043
ISSN:2157-9555
DOI:10.1109/ICNC.2008.473