Costly Signaling in Human Communication

• Published in: The Handbook of Communication Science and Biology pp. 50 - 62
• Main Authors: Reid, Scott A., Zhang, Jinguang, Anderson, Grace L., Keblusek, Lauren
• Format: Book Chapter
• Language: English
• Published: Routledge 2020
• Edition: 1
• Subjects: Ortolan Buntings; Duchenne Laughter; non-Duchenne Laughter; Vulnerability Cost; Human Communication Science; Anger Expressions; Social Alliances; Costly Signaling Theory; Low Quality Individuals; AET; Human Nonverbal Communication; Red Deer Stags; Fundamental Frequency; Handicap Principle; Abdominal Muscles; Developmental Cost; Friendly Intentions; Intense Signals; Affection Exchange Theory; MIDUS Study; Honest Signals; Sexual Concordance; Bilateral Temporoparietal Junction
• ISBN: 9780815376736; 9780815376712; 0815376715; 0815376731
• DOI: 10.4324/9781351235587-6

If certain communications (e.g., mating or threat calls) increase the likelihood of accessing fitness-enhancing resources, then individuals will communicate to gain benefits without reciprocation. If cheating were too common, however, receivers could not distinguish signalers of varying quality and signals would not be worth attending to. Costly signaling theory solves this problem: Signal reliability is ensured when high-quality signalers pay tolerable costs that are prohibitive for low-quality signalers. This chapter illustrates the theory, discusses work on human aggressive intention signaling, and offers a theory of laughter. Costly signaling theory should inspire new research on human communication science. This chapter discusses the costly signalling theory and the work on human aggressive intention signaling, and offers a theory of laughter. Costly signaling theory should inspire new research on human communication science. A signal is "an act or structure that alters the behavior of another organism, which evolved because of that effect, and which is effective because the receiver's response has also evolved". Costs are expressed in the currency of biological fitness and are assumed to be consistent with the selfish gene approach. Multiple cost types may apply to any given signal and may vary across the life course of an individual. The honesty of anger expressions needs an explanation because such expressions enhance the angry person's chance of obtaining fitness-enhancing resources, and the signal itself is not physically constrained. Costly signaling theory will ultimately serve as an organizing framework for much of our understanding of human nonverbal communication.