Is Eve nearby? Analysing protocols under the distant-attacker assumption

Various modern protocols tailored to emerging wire-less networks, such as body area networks, rely on the proximity and honesty of devices within the network to achieve their security goals. However, there does not exist a security framework that supports the formal analysis of such protocols, leavi...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in2022 IEEE 35th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF) pp. 17 - 32
Main Authors Gil-Pons, Reynaldo, Horne, Ross, Mauw, Sjouke, Tiu, Alwen, Trujillo-Rasua, Rolando
Format Conference Proceeding
LanguageEnglish
Published IEEE 01.08.2022
Subjects
Body area networks
Computational modeling
distance bounding
distant attacker
formal verification
Internet of Things
key exchange
Object recognition
Protocols
Security
security protocols
Specification languages
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Summary:Various modern protocols tailored to emerging wire-less networks, such as body area networks, rely on the proximity and honesty of devices within the network to achieve their security goals. However, there does not exist a security framework that supports the formal analysis of such protocols, leaving the door open to unexpected flaws. In this article we introduce such a security framework, show how it can be implemented in the protocol verification tool Tamarin, and use it to find previously unknown vulnerabilities on two recent key exchange protocols.
DOI:10.1109/CSF54842.2022.9919655