Imposing Sanctions: States, Firms, and Economic Coercion
An examination of economic sanctions enforcement develops a game theoretic model to study the strategic interaction between sender governments & their domestic firms, some of whom might wish to continue trading with target governments. It is contended that the capacity for sender countries to im...
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Published in | International Studies Review Vol. 5; no. 4; pp. 65 - 79 |
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Main Authors | , |
Format | Journal Article |
Language | English |
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Oxford, UK
Blackwell Publishing
01.12.2003
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Abstract | An examination of economic sanctions enforcement develops a game theoretic model to study the strategic interaction between sender governments & their domestic firms, some of whom might wish to continue trading with target governments. It is contended that the capacity for sender countries to impose the costs of halted trade & investment depends on the extent to which the sender governments can induce domestic firm to abide by sanctions law. Thus, the model is designed to identify conditions under which firms choose to abide by rather than evade sanctions law. The players, moves, outcomes, payoffs, & solution concept used in the model are specified before offering some specific examples of the game. The conditions necessary for a firm to violate are then scrutinized to generate six hypotheses for future empirical research. 1 Table, 26 References. J. Zendejas |
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AbstractList | An examination of economic sanctions enforcement develops a game theoretic model to study the strategic interaction between sender governments & their domestic firms, some of whom might wish to continue trading with target governments. It is contended that the capacity for sender countries to impose the costs of halted trade & investment depends on the extent to which the sender governments can induce domestic firm to abide by sanctions law. Thus, the model is designed to identify conditions under which firms choose to abide by rather than evade sanctions law. The players, moves, outcomes, payoffs, & solution concept used in the model are specified before offering some specific examples of the game. The conditions necessary for a firm to violate are then scrutinized to generate six hypotheses for future empirical research. 1 Table, 26 References. J. Zendejas |
Author | Bapat, Navin A. Clifton morgan, T. |
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Notes | istex:8ED8EBD1E6D823D4298A9CF672233067FDBCCAED 1The research presented here was supported by National Science Foundation Grant SES-0137792. We would like to thank Dan Drezner and the editors of this volume for their comments and suggestions. ark:/67375/WNG-BQ00KWT5-0 ArticleID:MISR00504007 ObjectType-Article-2 SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-1 content type line 23 ObjectType-Article-1 ObjectType-Feature-2 |
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References | Morgan, T. Clifton, and Valerie L. Schwebach. (1996) Economic Sanctions as Instruments of Foreign Policy: The Role of Domestic Politics. International Interactions 21: 247-263. Bolks, Sean M., and Dina Al-Sowayel. (2000) How Long Do Economic Sanctions Last? Examining the Sanctions Process through Duration. Political Research Quarterly 53: 241-265. Tsebelis, George. (1990) Are Economic Sanctions Effective? A Game Theoretic Analysis. Journal of Conflict Resolution 34: 3-28. Salpukas, Agis. (1997) Foreign Energy, Domestic Politics; Burmese Project Tests Unocal Resolve. New York Times, May 22: D1. Morrow, James D. (1994) Game Theory for Political Scientists. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Drury, A. Cooper. (1998) Revisiting Economic Sanctions Reconsidered. Journal of Peace Research 35: 497-509. Martin, Lisa. (1992) Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Luce, R. Duncan, and Howard Raiffa. (1957) Games and Decisions. New York: Wiley. Morgan, T. Clifton, and Valerie L. Schwebach. (1997) Fools Suffer Gladly: The Use of Economic Sanctions in International Crises. International Studies Quarterly 41: 27-50. Pape, Robert. (1997) Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work. International Security 22: 90-136. Smith, Alastair. (1996) The Success and Use of Economic Sanctions. International Interactions 21: 229-245. Wagner, R. Harrison. (1988) Economic Interdependence, Bargaining Power, and Political Influence. International Organization 42: 461-482. Drury, A. Cooper. (2001) Sanctions as Coercive Diplomacy: The US President's Decision to Initiate Economic Sanctions. Political Research Quarterly 54: 485-508. Kaempfer, W., and A. Lowenberg. (1998) Unilateral vs. Multilateral International Sanctions: A Public Choice Perspective. International Studies Quarterly 43: 37-58. Hufbauer, Gary, J. J. Schott, and Kimberly Ann Elliot. (1990) Economic Sanctions Reconsidered. Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics. Drezner, Daniel. (1998) Conflict Expectations and the Paradox of Economic Coercion. International Studies Quarterly 42: 709-731. Binmore, Ken. (1992) Fun and Games: A Text on Game Theory. Lexington: Basil Blackwell. Ordeshook, Peter C. (1986) Game Theory and Political Theory. New York: Cambridge University Press. Drezner, Daniel. (1999) The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations. New York: Cambridge University Press. |
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SubjectTerms | Borders Business structures Comparative politics Compliance Economic benefits Economic sanctions Economic value Enterprises Foreign policy Game Theory Globalization Government International conflicts International politics International relations International sanctions International security Law Enforcement Law firms Part I. The Second Image Reversed ... and Reversed Again Return on investment Sanctions Trade sanctions |
Title | Imposing Sanctions: States, Firms, and Economic Coercion |
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