Imposing Sanctions: States, Firms, and Economic Coercion

• Published in: International Studies Review Vol. 5; no. 4; pp. 65 - 79
• Main Authors: Clifton morgan, T., Bapat, Navin A.
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Oxford, UK Blackwell Publishing 01.12.2003
• Subjects: Borders; Business structures; Comparative politics; Compliance; Economic benefits; Economic sanctions; Economic value; Enterprises; Foreign policy; Game Theory; Globalization; Government; International conflicts; International politics; International relations; International sanctions; International security; Law Enforcement; Law firms; Part I. The Second Image Reversed ... and Reversed Again; Return on investment; Sanctions; Trade sanctions
• ISSN: 1521-9488; 1468-2486
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1079-1760.2003.00504007.x

An examination of economic sanctions enforcement develops a game theoretic model to study the strategic interaction between sender governments & their domestic firms, some of whom might wish to continue trading with target governments. It is contended that the capacity for sender countries to impose the costs of halted trade & investment depends on the extent to which the sender governments can induce domestic firm to abide by sanctions law. Thus, the model is designed to identify conditions under which firms choose to abide by rather than evade sanctions law. The players, moves, outcomes, payoffs, & solution concept used in the model are specified before offering some specific examples of the game. The conditions necessary for a firm to violate are then scrutinized to generate six hypotheses for future empirical research. 1 Table, 26 References. J. Zendejas