Effect of Global Navigation Satellite Signal (GNSS) Spoofing on Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) via Field Measurement

• Published in: 2023 IEEE 16th Malaysia International Conference on Communication (MICC) pp. 41 - 45
• Main Authors: Norhashim, N., Kamal, N. L. Mohd, Sahwee, Z., Shah, S. Ahmad, Sathyamoorthy, D., Alfian, N.A
• Format: Conference Proceeding
• Language: English
• Published: IEEE 10.12.2023
• Subjects: Autonomous aerial vehicles; field measurements; Global navigation satellite system; Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS); Satellites; Security; Spoofing; Surveillance; Timing; unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV); Velocity measurement
• ISSN: 2694-5282
• DOI: 10.1109/MICC59384.2023.10419775

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) are vulnerable to several threats that lead to security problems, such as stealing video footage, artificial signal interference, jamming and spoofing. Any system that rely on satellite positioning technology can be targeted by spoofing to generate incorrect positioning / timing, which is accomplished by inserting false signals into the victim's receiver. For example, the attacker inserts different positioning coordinates in the system that will hijack or distract security / safety in airspace surveillance. The civil aircraft's signal is not unencrypted and easily spoofed. When spoofing occurs, the target UAV deviates from the original path, and the UAV flies to the target point. Hence, this paper investigates the preliminary effects of spoofing signals on a Garmin GPSMAP 66SR handheld GNSS receiver and a DJI Phantom UAV. The test was conducted via field measurements at an open area with GNSS spoofing signals generated using a GNSS simulator with increasing power levels from −140 to −95 dBm. It was found that the GNSS receiver was spoofed at −116 dBm, while for the UAV, the spoofing signal affected the navigation system as it showed abnormal operation and had to be flown using optical mode for navigation during the spoofing period and changed back to GNSS mode.