An evolutionary model of Braess's paradox and the social welfare optimal solution

The Braess's paradox is the phenomenon that increasing the resources leads to the reduction of the overall welfare, originally proposed in the field of transportation. An evolutionary game model is proposed to explicitly depict the process of individual learning in this phenomenon. It can shows...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in2019 6th International Conference on Information, Cybernetics, and Computational Social Systems (ICCSS) pp. 31 - 35
Main Authors Yu, Xianping, Wang, Kaiyue, Wang, Xin, Yu, Tongkui
Format Conference Proceeding
LanguageEnglish
Published IEEE 01.09.2019
Subjects
Braess's paradox
evolutionary game theory
road toll pricing
social welfare maximization
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Summary:The Braess's paradox is the phenomenon that increasing the resources leads to the reduction of the overall welfare, originally proposed in the field of transportation. An evolutionary game model is proposed to explicitly depict the process of individual learning in this phenomenon. It can shows clearly how the individual rationality leads to collective irrationality. A proper charging scheme is provided which can not only solve the Braess's paradox, but also maximize social welfare. This work provides inspiration for the policy to guide the self-interested individuals to achieve social welfare maximization.
ISSN:2639-4235
DOI:10.1109/ICCSS48103.2019.9115453