Realism and pragmatism

We have seen how Ramsey drew from his views on subjective probability a pragmatist conception of the justification of inductive beliefs (§1.2). In two short notes, "Reasonable degree of belief" (1928) and "Knowledge" (1929) he also draws the consequences of this conception for an...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inFrank Ramsey pp. 27 - 44
Main Authors Dokic, Jérôme, Engel, Pascal
Format Book Chapter
LanguageEnglish
Published United Kingdom Presses Universitaires de France 2001
Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group
Edition1
Subjects
Analytical philosophy & Logical Positivism
Philosophy of mathematics
Western philosophy, from c 1900
Reliable Process
Counterfactual Conditionals
Conditional Dispositions
Belief Habits
Overburdening
Atomic Propositions
Ramsey's Principle
Nonlinguistic Behaviour
Inferential Habits
Ramsey Test
Complex Universals
Logisch Philosophische Abhandlung
Inductive Beliefs
Ramsey Sentence
Epistemic Logic
Genuine Laws
Ramsey's Argument
PGC
Indicative Conditionals
Epistemic Theory Of Truth
Ramsey's Conception
Informational Equilibrium
Subject Predicate Distinction
Ramsey's View
Variable Hypotheticals
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Summary:We have seen how Ramsey drew from his views on subjective probability a pragmatist conception of the justification of inductive beliefs (§1.2). In two short notes, "Reasonable degree of belief" (1928) and "Knowledge" (1929) he also draws the consequences of this conception for an analysis of the concept of knowledge. According to the traditional analysis, taken up by Russell (1910, 1912), knowledge is justified true belief. Russell, anticipating in this Gettier's famous counterexamples, showed that there are cases of justified true beliefs which fail to be knowledge, since one could get such beliefs by accident. 1
ISBN:9780415408288
0415408288
0415287197
9780415287197
DOI:10.4324/9780203217832-3