Introduction: are we just machines?
This chapter focuses on John Searle's famous 'Chinese Room' argument which shows, he thinks, that no robot could possibly understand Chinese or anything else. The 'mind-body problem' has three main divisions: consciousness, intentionality and the relations between physical a...
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Published in | Mind and Body pp. 1 - 28 |
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Main Author | |
Format | Book Chapter |
Language | English |
Published |
United Kingdom
Routledge
2003
Taylor & Francis Group |
Edition | 1 |
Subjects | |
Online Access | Get full text |
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Summary: | This chapter focuses on John Searle's famous 'Chinese Room' argument which shows, he thinks, that no robot could possibly understand Chinese or anything else. The 'mind-body problem' has three main divisions: consciousness, intentionality and the relations between physical and psychological explanations. The idea that human beings are machines is mechanism. If it is correct, the relation between the mental and the physical is a lot less mysterious than many people suppose. The machine needs a set of different internal states to ensure that it can 'take account' of the various possible input combinations. Snoopy is a machine without either thoughts or feelings. Although Snoopy certainly has no thoughts or feelings, it has guided us towards some main features of the mind-body problem. However, if a more complex type of robot could have thoughts or even feelings, then the construction of such a robot would seem to solve the mind-body problem at a stroke. |
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ISBN: | 190268379X 1902683803 9781902683805 9781902683799 |
DOI: | 10.4324/9781315710549-1 |