The Treaty Problem: Understanding the Framers' Approach to International Legal Commitments
In 2014, when the Supreme Court decided 'Bond v. United States', it confronted an issue of structural federalism that had long vexed advocates of big and small government alike. The issue stemmed from the tension between the broad, exclusive power the Constitution grants to the federal gov...
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Published in | The Yale law journal Vol. 128; no. 3; pp. 843 - 870 |
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Main Authors | , |
Format | Journal Article |
Language | English |
Published |
New Haven
The Yale Law Journal Company, Inc
01.01.2019
Yale University, School of Law Yale Law Journal Company, Inc |
Subjects | |
Online Access | Get full text |
ISSN | 0044-0094 1939-8611 |
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Summary: | In 2014, when the Supreme Court decided 'Bond v. United States', it confronted an issue of structural federalism that had long vexed advocates of big and small government alike. The issue stemmed from the tension between the broad, exclusive power the Constitution grants to the federal government to conclude international treaties and the limitations that the Constitution places on Congress's domestic authority vis-a-vis the states. When these powers and limitations conflict, which should win out? How expansive should the federal government's treaty power be? For both champions and critics of international law, the Court's response in Bond left much to be desired. |
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Bibliography: | 2019-02-08T20:13:30+11:00 YALE LAW JOURNAL, Vol. 128, No. 3, Jan 2019: 843-870 AGIS_c.jpg Informit, Melbourne (Vic) YALE LAW JOURNAL, Vol. 128, No. 3, Jan 2019, 843-870 SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Commentary-1 content type line 14 |
ISSN: | 0044-0094 1939-8611 |