The Treaty Problem: Understanding the Framers' Approach to International Legal Commitments

In 2014, when the Supreme Court decided 'Bond v. United States', it confronted an issue of structural federalism that had long vexed advocates of big and small government alike. The issue stemmed from the tension between the broad, exclusive power the Constitution grants to the federal gov...

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Published inThe Yale law journal Vol. 128; no. 3; pp. 843 - 870
Main Authors FORD, JADE, SIMMONS, MARY ELLA
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published New Haven The Yale Law Journal Company, Inc 01.01.2019
Yale University, School of Law
Yale Law Journal Company, Inc
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ISSN0044-0094
1939-8611

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Summary:In 2014, when the Supreme Court decided 'Bond v. United States', it confronted an issue of structural federalism that had long vexed advocates of big and small government alike. The issue stemmed from the tension between the broad, exclusive power the Constitution grants to the federal government to conclude international treaties and the limitations that the Constitution places on Congress's domestic authority vis-a-vis the states. When these powers and limitations conflict, which should win out? How expansive should the federal government's treaty power be? For both champions and critics of international law, the Court's response in Bond left much to be desired.
Bibliography:2019-02-08T20:13:30+11:00
YALE LAW JOURNAL, Vol. 128, No. 3, Jan 2019: 843-870
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YALE LAW JOURNAL, Vol. 128, No. 3, Jan 2019, 843-870
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Commentary-1
content type line 14
ISSN:0044-0094
1939-8611