THE TOXIC SIDE EFFECTS OF SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY

The past two decades have seen a dramatic shift in the corporate landscape. For most of the twentieth century, well into the early 1990s, directors and executives of large U.S. corporations saw themselves as stewards of great economic institutions that should serve not only equity investors but also...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inUniversity of Pennsylvania law review Vol. 161; no. 7; pp. 2003 - 2023
Main Author Stout, Lynn A.
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Philadelphia University of Pennsylvania Law School 01.06.2013
University of Pennsylvania, Law School
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Summary:The past two decades have seen a dramatic shift in the corporate landscape. For most of the twentieth century, well into the early 1990s, directors and executives of large U.S. corporations saw themselves as stewards of great economic institutions that should serve not only equity investors but also customers, creditors, employees, suppliers, and the broader society. Today this "managerialist" philosophy is viewed as obsolete and inefficient. Many, and possibly most, public companies now embrace a shareholder-centered vision of good corporate governance that emphasizes "maximizing shareholder value" (typically measured by share price) over all other corporate goals.
Bibliography:UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW, Vol. 161, No. 7, Jun 2013: 2003-2023
2020-12-02T20:19:49+11:00
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW, Vol. 161, No. 7, Jun 2013, 2003-2023
Informit, Melbourne (Vic)
ISSN:0041-9907
1942-8537