THE TOXIC SIDE EFFECTS OF SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY
The past two decades have seen a dramatic shift in the corporate landscape. For most of the twentieth century, well into the early 1990s, directors and executives of large U.S. corporations saw themselves as stewards of great economic institutions that should serve not only equity investors but also...
Saved in:
Published in | University of Pennsylvania law review Vol. 161; no. 7; pp. 2003 - 2023 |
---|---|
Main Author | |
Format | Journal Article |
Language | English |
Published |
Philadelphia
University of Pennsylvania Law School
01.06.2013
University of Pennsylvania, Law School |
Subjects | |
Online Access | Get full text |
Cover
Loading…
Summary: | The past two decades have seen a dramatic shift in the corporate landscape. For most of the twentieth century, well into the early 1990s, directors and executives of large U.S. corporations saw themselves as stewards of great economic institutions that should serve not only equity investors but also customers, creditors, employees, suppliers, and the broader society. Today this "managerialist" philosophy is viewed as obsolete and inefficient. Many, and possibly most, public companies now embrace a shareholder-centered vision of good corporate governance that emphasizes "maximizing shareholder value" (typically measured by share price) over all other corporate goals. |
---|---|
Bibliography: | UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW, Vol. 161, No. 7, Jun 2013: 2003-2023 2020-12-02T20:19:49+11:00 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW, Vol. 161, No. 7, Jun 2013, 2003-2023 Informit, Melbourne (Vic) |
ISSN: | 0041-9907 1942-8537 |