An empirical comparison of three auction strategies for multiple products
This study investigates bidders' bidding strategies and the relative profitability of three auction strategies, one auction for the bundle, two simultaneous separate auctions, and two sequential separate auctions under a controlled environment. The results suggest that when there is high variat...
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Published in | International journal of business Vol. 18; no. 3; pp. 198 - 215 |
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Main Author | |
Format | Journal Article |
Language | English |
Published |
Fresno
Premier Publishing, Inc
22.06.2013
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Subjects | |
Online Access | Get full text |
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Summary: | This study investigates bidders' bidding strategies and the relative profitability of three auction strategies, one auction for the bundle, two simultaneous separate auctions, and two sequential separate auctions under a controlled environment. The results suggest that when there is high variation and no asymmetry among product values, the three selling mechanisms are equally profitable. When there is high asymmetry but no variation among product values, one auction for the bundle is more profitable than two separate auctions when there are two bidders, but less profitable than when there are ten bidders. Generally, selling products simultaneously or sequentially generates the same revenue. |
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ISSN: | 1083-4346 |