An Application of Expected Utility Modeling and Game Theory in IR: Assessment of International Bargaining on Iran's Nuclear Program

This article provides an introduction to the theoretical underpinnings of expected utility and game theory approaches in IR studies. It goes on to explore their application to a specific research subject, international bargaining on Iran's nuclear program. In this application, the article prese...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inAll Azimuth Vol. 8; no. 2; pp. 205 - 390
Main Author Ozdamar, Ozgur
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Ankara Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research 01.07.2019
Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research, Ihsan Dogramaci Peace Foundation
Subjects
Bargaining
Decision making
Economic models
Expected utility
Game theory
International negotiations
International relations
Nuclear arms control
Politics
Rationality
Russett, Bruce
Middle East
Iran
China
Connecticut
United Kingdom
Israel
Russia
Canada
Iraq
United States > US
Quebec Canada
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Summary:This article provides an introduction to the theoretical underpinnings of expected utility and game theory approaches in IR studies. It goes on to explore their application to a specific research subject, international bargaining on Iran's nuclear program. In this application, the article presents forecasts about Iran's nuclear program using a game theoretic, bounded rationality model called the expected utility model (Bueno de Mesquita 2002). Three analyses were made in December 2005, September 2006 and March 2007. All three forecasts appear to be in line with real-life developments regarding the issue. The results show that Iran has been losing international support since the analyses started, and the last forecast suggests a pro-US position supported by all major international actors. Also, all three analyses suggest that Russian and Chinese support is vital to curb the Iranian nuclear program.
ISSN:2146-7757