Practical Enclave Malware with Intel SGX

• Published in: Detection of Intrusions and Malware, and Vulnerability Assessment Vol. 11543; pp. 177 - 196
• Main Authors: Schwarz, Michael, Weiser, Samuel, Gruss, Daniel
• Format: Book Chapter
• Language: English
• Published: Switzerland Springer International Publishing AG 2019; Springer International Publishing
• Series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science
• Subjects: Intel SGX; Malware; Trusted execution environments
• ISBN: 3030220370; 9783030220372
• ISSN: 0302-9743; 1611-3349
• DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-22038-9_9

Modern CPU architectures offer strong isolation guarantees towards user applications in the form of enclaves. However, Intel’s threat model for SGX assumes fully trusted enclaves and there doubt about how realistic this is. In particular, it is unclear to what extent enclave malware could harm a system. In this work, we practically demonstrate the first enclave malware which fully and stealthily impersonates its host application. Together with poorly-deployed application isolation on personal computers, such malware can not only steal or encrypt documents for extortion but also act on the user’s behalf, e.g., send phishing emails or mount denial-of-service attacks. Our SGX-ROP attack uses new TSX-based memory-disclosure primitive and a write-anything-anywhere primitive to construct a code-reuse attack from within an enclave which is then inadvertently executed by the host application. With SGX-ROP, we bypass ASLR, stack canaries, and address sanitizer. We demonstrate that instead of protecting users from harm, SGX currently poses a security threat, facilitating so-called super-malware with ready-to-hit exploits. With our results, we demystify the enclave malware threat and lay ground for future research on defenses against enclave malware.