Libertad como causa. Heidegger, Kant y el problema metafisico de la libertad

This paper discusses Heidegger's criticism of Kant's conception of freedom as a peculiar kind of cause. With his view of freedom Kant consummates the central tendencies of traditional ontology, ultimately arising from the Greek understanding of Being in terms of "constant presence&quo...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inAnuario filosófico Vol. 43; no. 1; p. 161
Main Author Vigo, Alejandro G
Format Journal Article
LanguageSpanish
Published Pamplona Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Navarra 01.04.2010
Universidad de Navarra
Subjects
Freedoms
Heidegger, Martin
Heidegger, Martín
Kant, Immanuel
Kant, Immanuel (1724-1804)
Metaphysics
Philosophers
Transcendentalism
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Summary:This paper discusses Heidegger's criticism of Kant's conception of freedom as a peculiar kind of cause. With his view of freedom Kant consummates the central tendencies of traditional ontology, ultimately arising from the Greek understanding of Being in terms of "constant presence". But the causal view does not do justice to the deeper roots of freedom in the transcendence of Dasein. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]
ISSN:0066-5215
2173-6111