Quantitative Models of Commercial Policy

What tariffs would countries impose if they did not have to fear any retaliation? What would occur if there was a complete breakdown of trade policy cooperation? What would be the outcome if countries engaged in fully efficient trade negotiations? And what would happen to trade policy cooperation if...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inNBER Working Paper Series p. 22062
Main Author Ossa, Ralph
Format Paper
LanguageEnglish
Published Cambridge National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc 01.03.2016
Subjects
Cooperation
Economic theory
Game theory
Protectionism
Studies
Tariffs
Trade policy
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Summary:What tariffs would countries impose if they did not have to fear any retaliation? What would occur if there was a complete breakdown of trade policy cooperation? What would be the outcome if countries engaged in fully efficient trade negotiations? And what would happen to trade policy cooperation if the world trading system had a different institutional design? While such questions feature prominently in the theoretical trade policy literature, they have proven difficult to address empirically, because they refer to what-if scenarios for which direct empirical counterparts are hard to find. In this chapter, I introduce research which suggests overcoming this difficulty by applying quantitative models of commercial policy.
ISSN:0898-2937
DOI:10.3386/w22062