Handle with care: A primer on incentive regulation
Regulators increasingly rely upon incentive regulation as a substitute or refinement of traditional cost of service regulation. Focusing on incentive regulation in the US utility industry, this article first identifies four desirable attributes for incentive mechanisms. It develops a taxonomy of the...
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Published in | Energy policy Vol. 23; no. 9; pp. 769 - 779 |
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Main Authors | , |
Format | Journal Article |
Language | English |
Published |
Oxford
Elsevier Ltd
01.09.1995
Elsevier Elsevier Science Ltd |
Series | Energy Policy |
Subjects | |
Online Access | Get full text |
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Summary: | Regulators increasingly rely upon incentive regulation as a substitute or refinement of traditional cost of service regulation. Focusing on incentive regulation in the US utility industry, this article first identifies four desirable attributes for incentive mechanisms. It develops a taxonomy of the types of mechanisms that are available, identifies the issues that arise in the design and evaluation of these mechanisms, and then closes with a discussion of the risks associated with various mechanisms. |
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Bibliography: | ObjectType-Article-2 SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-1 content type line 23 |
ISSN: | 0301-4215 1873-6777 |
DOI: | 10.1016/0301-4215(95)00067-S |