Handle with care: A primer on incentive regulation

Regulators increasingly rely upon incentive regulation as a substitute or refinement of traditional cost of service regulation. Focusing on incentive regulation in the US utility industry, this article first identifies four desirable attributes for incentive mechanisms. It develops a taxonomy of the...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inEnergy policy Vol. 23; no. 9; pp. 769 - 779
Main Authors Pfeifenberger, Johannes P, Tye, William B
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Oxford Elsevier Ltd 01.09.1995
Elsevier
Elsevier Science Ltd
SeriesEnergy Policy
Subjects
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Summary:Regulators increasingly rely upon incentive regulation as a substitute or refinement of traditional cost of service regulation. Focusing on incentive regulation in the US utility industry, this article first identifies four desirable attributes for incentive mechanisms. It develops a taxonomy of the types of mechanisms that are available, identifies the issues that arise in the design and evaluation of these mechanisms, and then closes with a discussion of the risks associated with various mechanisms.
Bibliography:ObjectType-Article-2
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-1
content type line 23
ISSN:0301-4215
1873-6777
DOI:10.1016/0301-4215(95)00067-S