Board Independence and Changes in Defined-Benefit Plan Funding

Abstract The funding of defined-benefit plans has garnered the attention of academicians, practitioners, and policymakers. Drawing upon agency and organizational control theories, this study investigates the implications of board independence on changes in defined-benefit funding. Using a panel data...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inAdvances in Industrial and Labor Relations Vol. 21; pp. 119 - 141
Main Author Mullins, Frank
Format Book Chapter
LanguageEnglish
Published United Kingdom Emerald Group Publishing Limited 01.01.2015
Emerald Publishing Limited
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Summary:Abstract The funding of defined-benefit plans has garnered the attention of academicians, practitioners, and policymakers. Drawing upon agency and organizational control theories, this study investigates the implications of board independence on changes in defined-benefit funding. Using a panel dataset of S&P 500 companies sponsoring defined-benefit plans, the author finds that corporate boards matter. Specifically, CEO duality and outside director representation are associated with year-to-year decreases in defined-benefit funding. Conversely, outside director ownership is related to year-to-year increases in defined-benefit funding. Furthermore, outside director ownership moderated the relationship between outside director representation and defined-benefit funding such that outside director representation is associated with year-to-year increases in defined-benefit plan funding when the percentage of outside director ownership is high.
ISBN:9781784413804
1784413801
ISSN:0742-6186
DOI:10.1108/S0742-618620140000021005