Chance, Preferences, and Predictions in Garbage Can Theory

We build three stochastic models of garbage can processes in an organization populated by boundedly rational agents. Although short-run behavior in our models can be quite chaotic, they generate systematic, testable predictions about patterns of organizational choice. These predictions are determine...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inThe Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice: Looking Forward at Forty Vol. 36; pp. 99 - 137
Main Authors Bendor, Jonathan, Shotts, Kenneth W
Format Book Chapter
LanguageEnglish
Published Emerald Group Publishing Limited 01.01.2012
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Summary:We build three stochastic models of garbage can processes in an organization populated by boundedly rational agents. Although short-run behavior in our models can be quite chaotic, they generate systematic, testable predictions about patterns of organizational choice. These predictions are determined, in fairly intuitive ways, by the degree of preference conflict among agents in the organization, by their patterns of attention, and by their tendencies to make errors. We also show that nontrivial temporal orders can arise endogenously in one of our models, but only when some form of intentional order, based on agents’ preferences, is also present.
ISBN:9781780527123
1780527128
ISSN:0733-558X
DOI:10.1108/S0733-558X(2012)0000036008