Alianzas y política: un juego entre agentes civiles y armados
Illegal armed agents try to replace the state both in the monopoly of violence and in the protection of civilian population. We pretend to show that this objective is achieved if armed agents build alliances with groups from the civilian population. How to build this type of alliances? We propose a...
Saved in:
Published in | Lecturas de economía Vol. 67; no. 67; pp. 71 - 98 |
---|---|
Main Authors | , |
Format | Journal Article |
Language | English |
Published |
Universidad de Antioquia, Departamento de Economía
01.12.2007
Universidad de Antioquia |
Series | Lecturas de Economía |
Subjects | |
Online Access | Get full text |
Cover
Loading…
Be the first to leave a comment!