Alianzas y política: un juego entre agentes civiles y armados

Illegal armed agents try to replace the state both in the monopoly of violence and in the protection of civilian population. We pretend to show that this objective is achieved if armed agents build alliances with groups from the civilian population. How to build this type of alliances? We propose a...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inLecturas de economía Vol. 67; no. 67; pp. 71 - 98
Main Authors Castillo, María del Pilar, Salazar, Boris
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Universidad de Antioquia, Departamento de Economía 01.12.2007
Universidad de Antioquia
SeriesLecturas de Economía
Subjects
alliances
game theory
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Summary:Illegal armed agents try to replace the state both in the monopoly of violence and in the protection of civilian population. We pretend to show that this objective is achieved if armed agents build alliances with groups from the civilian population. How to build this type of alliances? We propose a formal exercise, represented by a game, where an armed agent and a civilian one update their decisions concerning the relevance of already established alliances. Necessary and sufficient conditions for stability of alliances are derived from the results of our model.
ISSN:0120-2596