The Morality of Artificial Friends in Ishiguro’s Klara and the Sun

• Published in: Journal of science fiction and philosophy Vol. 5
• Main Author: Stenseke, Jakob
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Alfredo Mac Laughlin 15.06.2022
• Subjects: Filosofi; Filosofi, etik och religion; Humaniora och konst; Humanities; Languages and Literature; Litteraturstudier; Philosophy; Philosophy, Ethics and Religion; Specific Literatures; Språk och litteratur
• ISSN: 2573-881X; 2573-881X

Can artificial entities be worthy of moral considerations? Can they be artificial moral agents (AMAs), capable of telling the difference between good and evil? In this essay, I explore both questions—i.e., whether and to what extent artificial entities can have a moral status (“the machine question”) and moral agency (“the AMA question”)—in light of Kazuo Ishiguro’s 2021 novel Klara and the Sun. I do so by juxtaposing two prominent approaches to machine morality that are central to the novel: the (1) view “from within,”including the standard (or “metaphysical”) perspective on moral agency, and the (2) view “from outside,” which includes behaviorism, functionalism and the social-relational perspective. Importantly, while the story illustrates both views, it exposes the epistemological vulnerability of the first in relation to the practical and social reality imposed by the second. That is, regardless of what metaphysical properties the Artificial Friend Klara can be said to have (from within), her moral status as well as agency ultimately depend on the views of others (from outside), including the others’ own epistemic beliefs about the nature of consciousness and personhood.