People who believe implausible claims are not cognitive misers: Evidence from evaluation tasks

Belief in epistemically implausible claims, such as climate change is a hoax and vaccines are harmful, is a pervasive problem. We test the idea that people who believe such claims possess a generally lazy thinking style (the miserly hypothesis). Across three studies, we compared believers and nonbel...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inJournal of applied research in memory and cognition
Main Authors Robson, Samuel G., Faasse, Kate, Gordon, Eliza-Rose, Jones, Samuel P., Smith, Natasha, Martire, Kristy A.
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Washigton Society for Applied Research in Memory and Cognition 19.09.2024
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Summary:Belief in epistemically implausible claims, such as climate change is a hoax and vaccines are harmful, is a pervasive problem. We test the idea that people who believe such claims possess a generally lazy thinking style (the miserly hypothesis). Across three studies, we compared believers and nonbelievers of implausible claims using evidence evaluation tasks involving fictitious scenarios. Study 1 focused on high- and low-quality evidence from a forensic expert, whereas Study 2 involved evidence in a medical setting. Study 3 assessed the effect of time constraints on evaluations. We found little evidence for the miserly hypothesis; believers and nonbelievers did not significantly differ in their sensitivity to high- and low-quality evidence, and both groups’ evaluations were equally affected by time constraints. Both believers and nonbelievers displayed a tendency for effortful, analytic thinking. Our findings challenge the notion that believing implausible claims is rooted in a general lack of effortful thinking. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved) (Source: journal abstract)
ISSN:2211-3681
2211-369X
DOI:10.1037/mac0000190