Dynamic pricing mechanism to achieve Pareto optimality in a seed production contract

This chapter examines enforcement of intellectual property protection (IPP) for seed and plant innovations through production contracts. Findings from a game-theoretic model suggest that the seed company's choice variables, such as seed prices and quantities in relation to seed quality, the far...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inAgricultural biotechnology and intellectual property: seeds of change pp. 172 - 189
Main Authors Umeno, S, Kesan, J. P
Format Book Chapter
LanguageEnglish
Published Wallingford, UK CABI 2007
Subjects
biotechnology
breeders' rights
contracts
game theory
intellectual property rights
pricing
seed industry
seeds
simulation models
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Summary:This chapter examines enforcement of intellectual property protection (IPP) for seed and plant innovations through production contracts. Findings from a game-theoretic model suggest that the seed company's choice variables, such as seed prices and quantities in relation to seed quality, the farmer's risk averseness, research and development cost for the seed and credible threats against the farmer-saved seed, could make deviations from the terms and conditions in the contract (i.e. farmer seed saving) economically unattractive to the farmer, while promoting his participation in the contract. The results propose a dynamic pricing mechanism for the foundation seed stock for economically efficient enforcement of property rights for seed varieties.
ISBN:9781845932015
1845932013
DOI:10.1079/9781845932015.0172