Rationale Wirtschaftspolitik in einem komplexen System

• Published in: Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik Vol. 50; no. 1; pp. 68 - 76
• Main Author: Streit, Manfred E.
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Lucius & Lucius 01.04.2001
• ISSN: 0721-3808; 2366-0317
• DOI: 10.1515/zfwp-2001-0105

Starting point for the present analysis is the finding, that a market economy represents an interactive complex and open system. A discussion of these properties emphasised by systems theory leads to the result, that attempts to steer such a system by means of economic policy have to face narrow boundaries, which can only be surpassed by initiating unpredictable reactions of the system. As a consequence the steering knowledge is considered to be unsatisfactory from the point of view of an economic policy guided by the rationality principle. This leads to the question, how interventions should look like, which comply with the steering properties of the system. It requires a reformulation of the criterion of systems conformity by drawing on two processes, which govern the economic performance of the system. According to this criterion, interventions should neither interfere with the self-coordination of the actors nor with their self control by competitive action. Considering typical examples of interventions leads to the unpleasant result that there are good reasons to accept the hypothesis of rent-seeking as a salient feature of economic policy-making. Interventions emerge from the interaction between a rent-seeking lobby and rent-creating political actors. Finally considering scientific policy advice, a conflict between the advisor who himself has committed to systems conformity, and the advised political actor, who is involved in rent-creating, is bound to emerge. This conflict can only be solved by engaging in constitutional reforms, which change the incentive situation of political actors completely. However, such reforms are difficult to bring about, because they manifestly go against the interests of political actors who have to set their own constitutional rules.