Discretionary Powers of Governor—III: An Interpretation from Federal Perspective

• Published in: Indian journal of public administration Vol. 64; no. 1; pp. 49 - 72
• Main Author: Pankaj, Ashok
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: 01.03.2018
• ISSN: 0019-5561; 2457-0222
• DOI: 10.1177/0019556117735447

This article examines the scope of discretionary powers of governor of a state in India from federal perspective and argues that they are against the principle of ‘cabinet responsibility’, an essential feature of parliamentary form of government that India intertwined with the federal constitution. These apparent anachronistic constitutional provisions were inherited from the Government of India Act, 1935, and retained with some modifications in the Constitution of Independent India as an institutional safeguard for the unity and integrity of Union of India that was formed by the merger of more than 500 princely states and a number of British administered provinces. As against the intentions of the constitution makers, the use of discretionary powers by governors has remained short of constitutional propriety, and it has been a major source of tension in centre–state relations. This has been partly because of the scope of powers itself and partly because of political factors. This article adds to various attempts of defining the scope of discretionary powers of the governor. A governor, appointed on political considerations, flippantly sets aside norms, values and constitutional propriety, expected of him in exercise of his/her powers. The lack of tenurial security makes him susceptible to the pressure of the union government. Only through political consensus, a solution can be found out to resolve this tricky issue of Indian federalism.