The EU’s “Democracy Promotion” Policies in Ukraine and Georgia: Is it a Normative Cover in front of the EU-Russia Tug-of-Love?

The EU democracy promotion literature mainly focuses either on its ways and tools in promoting democracy with successes and failures, or on the role of authoritarian actors with countervailing measures in impeding on the democratization paths of target states. Yet, a rare of studies examines what th...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inYönetim Bilimleri Dergisi Vol. 21; no. 47; pp. 1 - 26
Main Author YILDIZ, Tuğçe
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published 28.01.2023
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Summary:The EU democracy promotion literature mainly focuses either on its ways and tools in promoting democracy with successes and failures, or on the role of authoritarian actors with countervailing measures in impeding on the democratization paths of target states. Yet, a rare of studies examines what the EU actually promotes and with which underlying motivations. This article suggests that the EU democracy promotion is not just an outcome of bilateral relations between the EU and target states but an outcome of interdependent strategic interests of the EU, target country and illiberal regional power. Thus, it is shaped by not only the EU’s normative ideals and local needs as it declared but mostly the interrelated clash of interests between different actors in the region. The main argument of this study is that the EU’s differentiated democracy promotion agendas in target countries, which are very similar in terms of their local contexts or in the same region, stems from the presence of illiberal regional power(s), who has certain actorness in that region. Based upon this argument, this study explores the EU’s differentiated democracy promotion agendas in Ukraine and Georgia and the role of illiberal regional power -here Russia-, who has certain leverage over these states. By examining the periodical differentiation EU’s democracy promotion agendas towards Ukraine and Georgia, it concludes that the EU has changed its democracy promotion agendas depending on the changes in bilateral relations between Russia and Ukraine/Georgia. The EU democracy promotion literature mainly focuses either on its ways and tools in promoting democracy with successes and failures, or on the role of authoritarian actors with countervailing measures in impeding on the democratization paths of target states. Yet, a rare of studies examines what the EU actually promotes and with which underlying motivations. This article suggests that the EU democracy promotion is not just an outcome of bilateral relations between the EU and target states but an outcome of interdependent strategic interests of the EU, target country and illiberal regional power. Thus, it is shaped by not only the EU’s normative ideals and local needs as it declared but mostly the interrelated clash of interests between different actors in the region. The main argument of this study is that the EU’s differentiated democracy promotion agendas in target countries, which are very similar in terms of their local contexts or in the same region, stems from the presence of illiberal regional power(s), who has certain actorness in that region. Based upon this argument, this study explores the EU’s differentiated democracy promotion agendas in Ukraine and Georgia and the role of illiberal regional power -here Russia-, who has certain leverage over these states. By examining the periodical differentiation EU’s democracy promotion agendas towards Ukraine and Georgia, it concludes that the EU has changed its democracy promotion agendas depending on the changes in bilateral relations between Russia and Ukraine/Georgia.
ISSN:1304-5318
DOI:10.35408/comuybd.1078227